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Litigants at the United States Supreme Court spend 
considerable amounts of money to hire the best lawyers. The 
purported reason why, of course, is obvious: higher quality lawyers 
are more likely to achieve victory. With the stakes so high in so 
many Supreme Court cases, litigants hire the best. When it comes to 
locating the best, litigants often look to attorneys who once worked 
in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). The Solicitor General 
(SG) is the attorney for the United States in the Supreme Court. The 
SG and attorneys in the OSG litigate nearly every Supreme Court 
case that involves the United States. Their successes are well known. 
So, when OSG attorneys leave the office and hang out their shingles 
in private practice, people notice. 
Given their reputations, former OSG attorneys command 
considerable legal fees in the private sector. For example, in 2015, 
former SG Paul Clement charged $1,350 per hour for his legal 
services.1 In 2013, former SG Ted Olson charged $1,800 per hour for 
his.2 Former deputy and assistant SGs also charge huge fees. Former 
Assistant SG Lisa Blatt earns considerable legal fees commensurate 
with her reputation as one of the top Supreme Court litigators,3 as 
                                                     
1. RYAN C. BLACK & RYAN J. OWENS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: EXECUTIVE BRANCH INFLUENCE AND JUDICIAL 
DECISIONS (2012); see also Staci Zaretsky, Federal Judge Says Paul Clement Isn’t 
Special Enough to Command Insane Hourly Rates, ABOVE THE L. (Apr. 6, 2015, 
1:43 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2015/04/federal-judge-says-paul-clement-isnt-
special-enough-to-command-insane-hourly-rates/ [https://perma.cc/Q66A-3MDH]. 
2. David Lat, New Data on Hours, Billing Rates, and Corporate Legal 
Spending, ABOVE THE L. (Jan. 10, 2013, 4:27 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2013/01/ 
new-data-on-hours-billing-rates-and-corporate-legal-spending/ [https://perma.cc/U5U5-
DHYV]. 
3. Tony Mauro, Leading Supreme Court Advocate Leaves SG’s Office,
THE BLT: THE BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (May 15, 2009, 12:26 PM), http://legaltimes. 
typepad.com/blt/2009/05/leading-supreme-court-advocate-leaves-sgs-office.html 
[https://perma.cc/79BH-8N5P]; Marisa M. Kashino, 2011-2012 Top Lawyers: 
Supreme Court Lawyers, WASHINGTONIAN (Dec. 30, 2011), http://www. 
washingtonian.com/articles/people/2011-2012-top-lawyers-supreme-court-lawyers/ 
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does former Deputy SG Maureen Mahoney.4 When he left private 
practice to join the D.C. Circuit, Chief Justice John Roberts walked 
away from a million-dollar-a-year salary.5 Litigants pay these 
charges because they believe former OSG attorneys will achieve 
victory at the High Court. They know the right arguments to make; 
they know what justices want to see; and they know how to deliver. 
Or so the argument goes. 
The central question we address in this Article is whether 
former OSG attorneys are more likely to win their cases than 
attorneys who never worked in the OSG and, consequently, whether 
litigants spend their money wisely when they pay extra to hire 
former OSG attorneys. Asked simply, are these attorneys more 
effective than other attorneys who never worked in the OSG? If so, it 
may be worth spending the extra money to retain them; if not, 
litigants might more profitably spend their resources elsewhere. 
So there is no confusion about our results, we state them here. 
The Supreme Court is no more likely to rule in favor of former OSG 
attorneys than other attorneys. When we compare attorneys who 
have similar levels of Supreme Court experience, similar resources, 
and other characteristics that are similar, former OSG attorneys are 
no more likely to win than attorneys who never worked in the OSG. 
In short, a party who has the choice of hiring two otherwise identical 
attorneys need not spend extra money to retain counsel who once 
worked in the OSG.  
This Article unfolds in four parts. In Part I, we examine 
literature on the effects of attorney representation, focusing on recent 
scholarship that analyzes legal briefs and oral argumentation. In Part 
II, we specifically discuss former OSG attorneys. We discuss what 
scholars know (or think they know) about SG success and how those 
features might translate later to former OSG success in private 
practice. Building on these works, we then lay out our testable 
hypothesis. In Part III, we explain our dataset and provide 
background on some of the more specialized measures we employ. 
                                                                                                               
index.php [https://web.archive.org/web/20150924052107/http://www.washingtonian. 
com/articles/people/2011-2012-top-lawyers-supreme-court-lawyers/index.php]. 
4. Kim Eisler, Big Guns: Washington’s Top 30 Lawyers (2007),




5. Linda Greenhouse, Chief Justice Advocates Higher Pay for Judiciary,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/01/us/01scotus.html?_r=0. 
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We also discuss the matching methodology we use to identify 
whether former OSG attorneys are more likely to be successful at the 
Court. In Part IV, we present our empirical results. 
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF QUALITY REPRESENTATION IN UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT CASES
Perhaps it should come as no surprise, but empirical research 
has shown that attorneys play an important role in Supreme Court 
decision making. Higher quality attorneys tend to win their cases. 
Lower quality attorneys tend to lose theirs. For example, McAtee 
and McGuire point out that despite the Court’s shift to the right in 
the last two decades, “carefully crafted legal arguments have 
successfully limited that conservatism” in a host of areas.6 They find 
that lawyers with greater experience generally are more likely to win 
their cases.7 In a similar vein, McGuire argues that attorneys with 
greater experience are more likely to win their cases when pitted 
against attorneys with less experience.8 As he put it, “the litigation 
experiences of the counsel who represent [parties] are a significant 
determinant of judicial outcomes.”9
Just what it is about attorney experience that translates into 
success is unclear: Is it the ability to craft better arguments? The 
knowledge of what justices want to hear (and then providing it)? The 
knowledge of what cases are ripe for review? On these questions, the 
literature is largely unclear. What is clear, though, is that 
characteristics tied to attorney quality tend to correlate with 
success.10 And, as we discuss more fully below, this success can be 
traced to the brief writing stage and to the oral argument stage.  
A. Attorneys, Quality Brief Writing, and Supreme Court Success 
Recent research shows that the quality of merits briefs can 
influence how the Supreme Court decides cases. Attorneys who 
                                                     
6. Andrea McAtee & Kevin T. McGuire, Lawyers, Justices, and Issue 
Salience: When and How Do Legal Arguments Affect the U.S. Supreme Court?, 41 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 259, 260-61 (2007).  
7. See id. at 275.  
8. Kevin T. McGuire, Repeat Players in the Supreme Court: The Role of 
Experienced Lawyers in Litigation Success, 57 J. POL. 187, 187 (1995).  
9. See id.
10. See Paul J. Wahlbeck, The Life of the Law: Judicial Politics and Legal 
Change, 59 J. POL. 778 (1997). 
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write higher quality briefs are more likely to win their cases. We 
examine the empirical scholarship on brief writing and the conditions 
under which briefs appear to influence justices. All this, of course, is 
to show that better lawyering can win cases and to provide context to 
the central question whether former OSG lawyers are more likely 
than other lawyers to win their cases. 
A number of recent studies have examined how attorney briefs 
might influence the Supreme Court. Justin Wedeking provides an 
excellent study that highlights the importance of brief writing.11 He 
examines whether attorneys use “frames” strategically to influence 
the dimension on which the High Court evaluates cases.12 “Frames 
are defined as a small collection of related words that emphasize 
some aspect of an issue at the expense of others.”13 Wedeking uses 
content analysis software to measure the most important words in 
case documents (e.g., cert petitions, party merits briefs, and amicus 
briefs) and to reveal certain “frames.”14 He finds that under certain 
conditions, a lawyer’s frame can increase or decrease his or her 
likelihood of winning.15
Long and Christensen likewise explore how the use of 
intensifiers (i.e., words such as clearly, obviously, and very) in 
parties’ briefs might influence their chances of success.16 They 
examine a sample of federal and state appellate briefs and find that 
when lawyers insert more intensifiers into their briefs, they are less 
likely to win.17 To be sure, the study is limited to civil cases and a 
small set of word choices (only twelve intensifier words).18
Nevertheless, the work does suggest that briefs may correlate with 
lawyer success before the High Court.  
In one of the most recent studies on the role of briefs before the 
High Court, Black, Owens, Hall, and Ringsmuth find that the 
language of briefs can convey information about an attorney’s 
credibility, which, in turn, influences his or her chances of success.19
                                                     
11. Justin Wedeking, Supreme Court Litigants and Strategic Framing, 54 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 617 (2010). 
12. See id.  
13. Id. at 617. 
14. See id. at 629.  
15. See id. at 627.  
16. Lance N. Long & William F. Christensen, Clearly, Using Intensifiers Is 
Very Bad—Or Is It?, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 171 (2008).  
17. See id. at 171.  
18. Id. at 181. 
19. Ryan C. Black, Matthew E.K. Hall, Ryan J. Owens & Eve Ringsmuth, 
The Role of Emotional Language in Briefs Before the U.S. Supreme Court, J.L. & 
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They discover that “[j]ustices are more likely to vote for parties 
whose briefs eschew emotionally charged language.”20 Specifically, 
an attorney who abstains from emotional language in a brief is more 
likely to win justices’ votes than an attorney who employs such 
language.21 “For petitioners, using minimal emotional language is 
associated with a 29% increase in their probability of capturing a 
justice’s vote. For respondents, the effect is even greater; using 
minimal emotional language is associated with a 100% increase in 
their probability of winning a justice’s vote.”22 As the authors see it,
attorneys who use emotionally charged language lose credibility in 
the eyes of the justices—and become less likely to capture their 
votes.23
It should come as no surprise that many people argue the SG—
and lawyers from the OSG—understand these results and, therefore, 
write briefs using the “correct” language. For example, Pam Corley 
employs plagiarism software to analyze whether the Court “borrows” 
language from party briefs and, if so, how much.24 Her argument is 
that attorneys writing quality briefs might be able to influence the 
content of the Court’s opinions and the content of law.25 The data 
generate interesting results. Justices borrow more language from the 
SG’s briefs than from other briefs.26 Justices also borrow more from 
Washington-elite attorneys and attorneys with more experience.27
B. Attorneys, Quality Oral Arguments, and Supreme Court Success 
The literature is also clear that attorney quality at oral argument 
influences whether the attorney wins or loses a case. Perhaps the 
clearest findings to this effect come from Johnson, Wahlbeck, and 
Spriggs.28 The method they employ to analyze the effect of oral 
                                                                                                               
CTS. (forthcoming 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2703875 [https://perma.cc/SR2F-
ESDW].  
20. Id. (manuscript at 2).  
21. Id.  
22. Id.  
23. Id. (manuscript at 27).  
24. Pamela C. Corley, The Supreme Court and Opinion Content: The 
Influence of Parties’ Briefs, 61 POL. RES. Q. 468, 471 (2008). 
25. Id. at 469.  
26. Id. at 476; see also BLACK & OWENS, supra note 1, at 104. 
27. Corley, supra note 24, at 476.  
28. Timothy R. Johnson, Paul J. Wahlbeck & James F. Spriggs, II, The 
Influence of Oral Arguments on the U.S. Supreme Court, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 99, 
108-09 (2006). 
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argument quality on a litigant’s likelihood of winning is quite clever. 
They analyzed the private records of former Justice Harry A. 
Blackmun.29 Justice Blackmun, it turns out, kept notes on all the 
attorneys who appeared at oral argument before him.30 The majority 
of these notes consisted of things like the questions asked by the 
justices and where the attorney went to law school.31 But Justice 
Blackmun also kept notes on how the attorney performed.32 More 
importantly, he privately “graded” each attorney.33
Justice Blackmun’s notes on attorney performance were 
varied—and interesting. Consider a few examples.34 In United States 
v. Sells Engineering, Inc. (81-1032), Justice Blackmun wrote: “He 
[respondent’s attorney] does all he can to lose this case.”35 In Whalen 
v. United States (78-5471), he wrote: “He [petitioner’s attorney] does 
not do well.”36 On the other hand, in Kellogg Co. v. Herrington (82-
825), Justice Blackmun observed a good performance by the 
respondent’s attorney, Robert E. Williams. In fact, he wrote: “I am 
now more sympathetic to respondent.”37 In Fuentes v. Shevin (70-
5039), he commented on a Deputy Attorney General from Florida: 
“He . . . persuades me but he will not persuade all the others.”38
After examining Justice Blackmun’s ratings of the attorneys, 
Johnson and his coauthors found that quality oral arguments were 
strongly correlated with a greater probability of victory for that 
party.39 That is, attorneys who Justice Blackmun rated as having done 
a better job were more likely to win their case—and this result held 
even while controlling for instances in which Justice Blackmun 
                                                     
29. Id. at 104.  
30. See id. at 99-100.  
31. See id. at 102.  
32. Id. at 99-100.  
33. See id.  
34. These examples all come from Timothy R. Johnson, The Digital 
Archives of Justices Blackmun and Powell Oral Argument Notes, U. OF MINN.
(2009), http://www.polisci.umn.edu/~tjohnson/oanotes.php [https://perma.cc/SY6R-
9VAN].
35. Id. (follow “1982 Term, Blackmun” hyperlink; then follow “81-1032” 
hyperlink).  
36. Id. (follow “1979 Term, Blackmun” hyperlink; then follow “78-5471” 
hyperlink).  
37. Id. (follow “1983 Term, Blackmun” hyperlink; then follow “82-825” 
hyperlink).  
38. Id. (follow “1971 Term, Blackmun” hyperlink; then follow “70-5039” 
hyperlink).  
39. Johnson, Wahlbeck & Spriggs, supra note 28, at 108.  
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might simply be ideologically inclined (or disinclined) to give the 
attorney a good grade.40
Justices have made similar remarks about the usefulness of 
quality oral argument. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist once 
stated: “[I]f an oral advocate is effective, how he presents his 
position during oral argument will have something to do with how 
the case comes out.”41 Justice Antonin Scalia has made similar 
remarks: “What often happens . . . is that the judge is undecided at 
the time of oral argument (the case is a close one), and oral argument 
makes the difference.”42 In his treatise on Appellate Practice and 
Procedure, Martineau argues: “Today, judges take advantage of oral 
argument to explore with the attorneys particular difficult legal or 
factual points in the case; failure to satisfy the judges on that point 
may result in an adverse decision.”43
These and other studies on brief writing and oral argument 
suggest that attorney quality can lead to a higher probability of 
victory for the party with the better lawyer. But the question remains: 
in general, which lawyers are better? Can we identify ex ante which 
lawyers are of higher quality than others? Many litigants and Court 
watchers say yes, and they point to former OSG attorneys as their 
examples. And clients put their money where their mouths are by 
paying former OSG lawyers large legal fees to represent them. Are 
these fees warranted? We will get to that question shortly. But, 
before we do so, we must first discuss the Office of the Solicitor 
General. 
II. THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, FORMER OSG
ATTORNEYS, AND QUALITY LAWYERING
It makes sense that clients and Court watchers believe former 
OSG attorneys are more likely to win their Supreme Court cases than 
other attorneys. After all, attorneys who argue on behalf of the OSG 
appear to win more cases than other attorneys. There are many 
reasons why current OSG attorneys are so influential. In what 
follows, we provide background on the OSG. Second, we provide 
                                                     
40. Id.  
41. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT, HOW IT WAS, HOW IT IS
276-77 (1987). 
42. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART 
OF PERSUADING JUDGES 139 (2008). 
43. ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON APPELLATE 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 404 (1987). 
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data on OSG success before the High Court. Third, we provide a 
brief overview on the possible reasons why the OSG wins so often—
and explain how those theories might also predict future success for 
these attorneys. Fourth, we provide data and a discussion on former 
OSG attorneys who participate before the Court. 
A. Background on the OSG44
The Solicitor General supervises and conducts the federal 
government’s litigation in the United States Supreme Court and is 
intricately involved in every stage of the government’s appellate 
litigation.45 The office is composed of three levels of attorneys in a 
structure that resemble a triangle.46 At the base—the widest part of 
the triangle—are the assistant SGs.47 There are roughly twenty 
assistant SGs at any one time.48 They are generalists (i.e., tend not to 
specialize in any one area of the law) and are the first to take on a 
case.49 That is, they are generally the first in the office to write the 
briefs in a case. They are professionals who tend to serve the office 
across presidential administrations.50 Above them are the deputy 
SGs.51 There are four deputies, each of whom is a specialist in a 
select area or areas of the law.52 They review and revise the first 
drafts of briefs (written by the assistant SGs) and make 
recommendations to the SG.53 With the exception of the principal 
deputy, who is a political appointee, the deputies are also non-
ideological professionals who often serve across presidential 
administrations.54 The SG sits atop the triangle.55 The SG is 
nominated by the President, confirmed by the senate, and serves at 
the pleasure of the President.56 The SG is always an attorney with a 
                                                     
44. Much of this discussion comes from BLACK & OWENS, supra note 1.
45. See generally RICHARD L. PACELLE, JR., BETWEEN LAW & POLITICS: THE 
SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE STRUCTURING OF RACE, GENDER, AND REPRODUCTIVE 
RIGHTS LITIGATION (2003). 
46. See BLACK & OWENS, supra note 1, at 16. 
47. Id.  
48. PACELLE, supra note 45, at 38.  
49. See id.  
50. See id.  
51. See id.  
52. See id.  
53. See id.  
54. See id.  
55. See id.  
56. See Pacelle, supra note 45, at 9, 47. 
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distinguished legal record who also has a strong political connection 
to the President in office.57
The SG serves two major functions. First, she represents the 
interests of the United States at the Supreme Court.58 When a case 
gets to the High Court, lawyers in the SG’s office write the briefs 
and present oral arguments.59 As Baum argues, lawyers in the SG’s 
office “do the bulk of the government’s legal work in Supreme Court 
cases, including petitions for hearings, the writing of briefs, and oral 
argument.”60
Second, the SG coordinates the United States’ legal position 
before the Supreme Court.61 That is, the SG decides which cases the 
United States will appeal when it loses its cases in the lower federal 
courts.62 If the government loses a case in a circuit court, it cannot 
appeal that loss to the Supreme Court without the SG’s permission.63
So, “if an agency loses a decision in a circuit court . . . and believes 
that decision was wrong, it can only file an appeal with the Supreme 
Court if the SG permits it to do so . . . .“64 (And, if the SG allows an 
appeal, OSG lawyers do the bulk of the work.) By choosing the cases 
and the issues the government will pursue before the Supreme Court, 
the SG can exercise control over the types of cases appealed by the 
government to the Court and set the administration’s policy in the 
courts.65
The SG also decides whether the United States will file an 
amicus curiae brief in any case involving the United States.66 “If the 
government is not involved in a case, the SG can inform the Court of 
its views.”67 “The government can file an amicus brief at either the 
agenda stage or at the merits stage of a case.”68 “When the 
                                                     
57. BLACK & OWENS, supra note 1, at 16.  
58. Id. at 20.  
59. Id. at 22-23.  
60. LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 84 (11th ed. 2013).  
61. BLACK & OWENS, supra note 1, at 20.  
62. The SG also decides whether, when the United States loses in a circuit 
court, the federal government will petition the circuit for rehearing en banc. See id.
63. Id.  
64. Id.  
65. Id. at 21.  
66. Id.  
67. Id.; see also SUP. CT. R. 37 (stating the United States can file an amicus 
curiae brief at its discretion, without satisfying the normal requirement placed on 
other groups to obtain the permission of the parties). By coordinating the cases in 
which the government files amicus briefs, the SG gains further leverage over its 
legal message. 
68. BLACK & OWENS, supra note 1, at 21.  
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government files an amicus brief with the Court, it is able to present 
its views on a case, and the broader policy consequences of a 
decision in the Court, despite the fact that it is not a named party in 
the suit.”69 In such cases, the government can make its policy wishes 
clear to the Court. 
The SG’s coordination function also allows the SG—and, thus, 
the executive branch—to get behind one agency at the expense of 
another. That is, “[w]hen two agencies conflict over the [appropriate] 
policy . . . , the SG, by selecting which will be the official 
government position, can clarify the government’s position for the 
Court and for the agencies.”70 Former SG Rex Lee summarized the 
SG’s gatekeeping power well when he stated: 
“If we’ve got the [F.C.C.] on one side of an issue and the Commerce 
Department on the other, and I decide that the government’s over-all [sic]
interest is better served by the F.C.C. . . . that means we’ll take the 
F.C.C.’s position to the Supreme Court, and the Commerce Department 
won’t go there at all.”71
So, OSG attorneys represent the United States before the 
Supreme Court. In that capacity, OSG attorneys behave much like 
other attorneys: they write briefs and deliver oral arguments to try 
and persuade the justices. At the same time, the OSG also serves an 
important coordinating function for the United States. The office 
centralizes the government’s appellate strategy. OSG attorneys, in 
short, have their hands in nearly everything appellate related. And, in 
                                                     
69. Id. at 21-22.  
70. Id. at 21.  
71. See John A. Jenkins, The Solicitor General’s Winning Ways, 69 A.B.A. 
J. 734, 738 (1983). It should be noted that infrequently the SG will allow 
independent agencies to argue their own cases and pursue appeals without the SG’s 
express permission. Chamberlain, for example, points out that SG Griswold had an 
agreement with the National Labor Relations Board that cases dealing with standard 
administrative law issues would go through the OSG while labor law cases requiring 
more technical knowledge could be argued by NLRB counsel. Ronald S. 
Chamberlain, Mixing Politics and Justice: The Office of the Solicitor General, 4 J.L.
& POL. 379, 388 (1987). On the whole, however, the SG coordinates all of the 
government’s activities before the Court. Indeed, the Court itself has affirmed its 
support of the SG’s coordination function. See, e.g., The Gray Jacket, 72 U.S. (5 
Wall.) 370, 371 (1866); The Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 458-59
(1868); United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 70 (1878); United States v. San 
Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273, 279 (1888); FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 
U.S. 88, 96 (1994). For more on this, see Seth P. Waxman, “Presenting the Case of 
the United States as It Should Be”: The Solicitor General in Historical Context, 2 J.
SUP. CT. HIST. 3 (1998). 
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so doing, they acquire significant skills and experience they can later 
use should they go into private practice. 
B. OSG Success Before the Court 
Lawyers from the OSG win most of their cases before the 
Court. As Figure 1 shows,72 the OSG has won roughly 60-70% of its 
cases during the time period under analysis. The OSG reached a peak 
point—and least in the modern era—in 2006, when it won 90% of its 
cases. 
Figure 1 
PERCENT OF ALL CASES WON BY THE OSG 
 
In Figure 2 below we turn our attention to cases where the OSG 
appears before the Court as a party to a case. As the figure makes 
clear, the OSG’s success varies by whether it is appearing as 
petitioner or respondent. As in all cases before the Court, it helps to 
be the petitioner. When the United States appears in a case as the 
petitioner, the Court is more likely to side with it. As petitioner, the 
United States has won the majority of its cases, save for the latter 
part of the Obama administration. But even then, the SG recovered 
quickly and won 60-80% of its cases. As respondent, the numbers 
are slightly worse—especially in recent years. Since the Supreme 
Court reverses around 65% of the cases it hears these days, one 
                                                     
72. The data for Figures 1-3 include all orally argued cases (i.e., both 
signed and per curiam opinions). 
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would expect the OSG would win about 35% of its cases.73 But it has 
performed better than that. Again, with the exception of very recent 
years, the OSG as respondent has won, overall, with the probability 
of a coin flip.  
Figure 2 
PERCENT OF CASES WON BY THE OSG AS PETITIONER OR RESPONDENT
As amicus curiae, the OSG’s success rate before the Court is 
even higher. As Figure 3 shows, with an average of roughly 70%, the 
OSG observes significant success as an amici. When the OSG 
weighs in and recommends the Court rule a certain way, the Court 
often rules that way. Simply put, whether the OSG appears as a 
friend of the Court or as a party to the case, OSG attorneys usually 
taste victory. No wonder people expect former OSG attorneys to be 
uniquely influential. 
                                                     
73. See SUP. CT. DATABASE, http://supremecourtdatabase.org/ [https:// 
perma.cc/Z3Q6-WL4M] (last visited Mar. 15, 2016). 
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Figure 3 
PERCENT OF CASES IN WHICH THE SUPREME COURT SIDED WITH THE 
PARTY SUPPORTED BY THE OSG AS AMICI
C. Reasons for OSG Success and How They Might Translate to 
Former OSG Success  
There are a number of possible reasons why the OSG wins so 
often. We have discussed and tested those theories more extensively 
elsewhere, so we only briefly reiterate them here. Scholars point to 
two general attributes of OSG success: attributes that are unique to 
the office and do not travel with the attorney when he or she leaves 
the OSG and those that are particular to the individual attorney and 
would therefore travel with the attorney when he or she leaves the 
OSG.  
1. Attributes Unique to the OSG 
Some scholars argue that the OSG wins so often because of the 
government’s resource advantages. When the United States litigates 
a case, it has more resources at its disposal than most litigants ever 
could amass. OSG attorneys can use the expertise of executive
branch agencies. It can refer back to winning arguments the office 
has made over decades of practice. And, of course, while the office 
has a budget, OSG attorneys are not subject to the same financial 
restrictions as private parties. With all these resources, then, the 
office becomes more likely to win than other attorneys. 
Another explanation for OSG success focuses on the OSG’s 
unique professional relationship with the Court. It argues that OSG 
attorneys succeed so often because they are consummate 
professionals. Though the SG is a presidential appointee, the office 
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has considerable obligations to the Court as well. As Deputy SG 
Michael Dreeben once stated: “[T]he Solicitor General owes a duty 
of unflinching candor to the Court.”74 The OSG appeals only those 
cases that are worthy of High Court review. The practice of 
confession error also supports the professionalism theory. When the 
United States wins a case in a lower federal court on grounds that the 
OSG believes have turned out to be erroneous, an OSG lawyer will 
inform the Court the decision should be vacated and remanded for 
reconsideration, though the government prevailed. This signals to the 
Court that the OSG is an honest broker of facts and can be trusted.  
A third explanation for OSG success argues that the OSG wins 
so often because justices are simply inclined, as government actors, 
to support the federal government. Justices must render decisions in 
an interdependent environment where they work with Congress and 
the President. When they interpret federal statutes and regulations, 
justices try to give effect to the wishes of Congress and the 
executive. When they decide constitutional questions, they often 
desire the views of the executive branch in terms of how easy or 
difficult it will be to implement possible policies. If justices see 
themselves as part of the same team as the government, it is no 
wonder they often side with the OSG. 
2. Attributes That Travel with Attorneys 
The theories above tie OSG success to attributes unique to the 
office itself. There are, however, other arguments that explain OSG 
success as a function of the attributes of individual lawyers—and 
these attributes would travel with the lawyer after he or she leaves 
the OSG. 
Some scholars argue the OSG wins so often because the SG 
can select which cases to appeal and which ones not to appeal.75 The 
SG, and attorneys within the office, can predict which cases are 
likely to be winners and which ones are likely to be losers. By 
choosing to move forward only with the winners, the OSG selects 
cases wisely. The end result is that the office has a high success rate. 
                                                     
74. Duke Univ. Sch. of Law, Lecture with Michael Dreeben, Criminal 
Deputy Solicitor General at the U.S. Department of Justice, YOUTUBE (Nov. 2, 
2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EmeHI4TryIw [https://perma.cc/8AVU-
HWZ3]. 
75. See, e.g., Chris Nicholson & Paul M. Collins, Jr., The Solicitor 
General’s Amicus Curiae Strategies in the Supreme Court, 36 AM. POL. RES. 382 
(2008). 
340 Michigan State Law Review  2016 
A selection effect explains OSG success. Of course, if an OSG 
attorney knew what made for “good” cases while working in the 
OSG, we suspect that attorney could take that knowledge with him 
or her when in private practice. 
Other scholars argue that the OSG wins so often because its 
lawyers are more experienced before the High Court than the 
lawyers against whom they argue.76 They know the types of 
information justices desire in cases. They “know how to construct 
able written and oral presentations . . . [and understand] which style 
and substance of argument may be most influential in different 
circumstances.”77 Over time, these attorneys acquire important 
insight into the justices themselves and the types of arguments 
justices accept, which, in turn, leads them to be more successful. So, 
for example, McGuire finds that attorneys who are more experienced 
than their opposing counsel are more likely to win their cases.78 And 
when attorney experience is accounted for, he finds that OSG 
attorneys are no more likely to win than other experienced 
attorneys.79 So, if this is the case, we would expect experience to 
matter for former OSG attorneys in private practice.  
Finally, and most important for our immediate purposes, many 
argue that the OSG wins so often because it hires the best, most 
skilled attorneys.80 For example, Salokar argues “[t]he members of 
the solicitor general’s office, both the political appointees and the 
small corps of career civil servants, are some of the best attorneys in 
our nation.”81 Many of these attorneys once clerked for federal circuit 
court judges and Supreme Court justices, and most of them 
graduated from the best law schools in the country.82 Indeed, former 
SG Charles Fried once explained the qualifications he looked for in 
hiring attorneys to work in the OSG:  
They have largely to do with very acute analytical and writing abilities, 
which are demonstrated, first of all, by very high academic records, then, 
also, by clerkships, appellate court clerkships. And in many, many 
instances, about half our lawyers are former Supreme Court clerks. And 
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then a certain amount of experience in doing, at a lesser level, I suppose, 
the kind of work that they would have to do in our office. . . . [A]ltogether 
we try to get a picture of the person in terms of their analytic and writing 
abilities.83  
Others agree. Carter Phillips, a former assistant SG, once 
stated: “The office has great success in getting A-plus lawyers who 
work hard without an ax to grind.”84 Lazarus argues that these high-
quality attorneys “know how to write briefs for [the Court], how to 
utilize precedent, and how to . . . exploit opportunities.”85 In her 
interviews with law clerks, Kelly Lynch quoted one as saying that 
the OSG has a “well deserved reputation for excellent written and 
oral advocacy.”86
Perhaps because they are so highly skilled, OSG attorneys have 
a tremendous record before the Supreme Court. And so it is perhaps 
no surprise that over time, more and more former OSG attorneys 
have become involved as private lawyers in litigation before the 
Court. If they are so skilled, they should carry those skills with them 
when they leave the OSG. That is, they should be as successful in 
private practice as they were while working in the OSG. 
In what follows, we examine how former OSG attorneys have 
become more active, followed with an examination of whether their 
increased involvement translates into victories for the parties they 
represent. 
D. Former OSGs Before the High Court  
Throughout history, a number of former SGs have gone on to 
litigate as private attorneys before the High Court. For example, John 
W. Davis argued 139 cases as a private lawyer after leaving the 
OSG; Charles Evan Hughes, Jr., (in between stints on the Supreme 
Court) practiced before the Court; and Thomas Thacher frequently 
litigated before the High Court as well.87
In recent years, former OSG attorneys have become even more 
involved with cases before the Court. Lazarus points out that this 
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change began with former SG Rex Lee.88 After Lee left the OSG, he 
went to work for the law firm Sidley Austin.89 And during the High 
Court’s next full term, Lee appeared in six cases.90 His behavior 
signaled to others that former OSG lawyers could profitably 
represent private parties before the Court.91
Competing law firms soon reached out to other former OSG 
lawyers.92 Mayer, Brown, and Platt actually hired a number of 
attorneys away from the OSG—and two of the attorneys they hired 
were then deputy Solicitors General.93 The law firm’s hiring practices 
soon earned it the nickname, “The Shadow Solicitor General’s 
Office.”94 Not to be outdone, Kirkland and Ellis soon hired Kenneth 
Starr to head up a Supreme Court practice.95 Hogan and Hartson later 
hired John Roberts after his stint as Principal Deputy SG.96 In 2002, 
WilmerHale hired former SG Seth Waxman who, in turn, hired a 
number of former OSG attorneys.97 Eventually, former OSG lawyers 
spread throughout private practice like fall leaves strewn across the 
lawn. 
These lawyers increasingly appeared at the High Court over 
time. As Figure 4 shows, there has been an awakening in former 
OSG attorneys before the High Court. While the number of total 
yearly cases decided by the Court has clearly decreased over time,98
former OSG lawyer participation has increased substantially. In the 
1980s, the Court decided well over 100 cases per term. In four terms, 
the justices actually decided over 140 cases. Today, however, that 
number is halved. The Court hears and decides roughly seventy cases
per term. The reason why is somewhat unclear;99 yet what is clear is 
that former OSG attorneys are involved with an increasing 
percentage of the Court’s docket. 
Today, former OSG attorneys are involved in nearly half the 
cases on the Court’s docket. And the trend seems to be toward 
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greater participation. During the 1980s roughly 10% of the Court’s 
cases involved an OSG alumnus. Even during the 1990s, that 
percentage hovered between 10% and 20%. Beginning around 2000, 
however, the percentage skyrocketed first to 30%, then to 40%, and 
then upward even to 50%. And while the last few Court terms have 
seen a return to roughly 40%, former OSG attorneys today are a 
substantial percent of the lawyers who argue before the Court. 
Figure 4 
THE NUMBER OF ORALLY ARGUED CASES (PANEL A) & 
THE PROPORTION OF THOSE CASES WITH PARTICIPATION BY A FORMER 
MEMBER OF THE OSG (PANEL B)
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Still, the question remains: Do these former OSG attorneys 
influence justices to a greater degree than attorneys who never 
worked in the OSG? The empirical evidence on this question is thin 
and mixed. On the one hand, at least one scholar argues that former
OSGs largely influence the agenda-setting stage—that is, what cases 
make it to the Supreme Court’s docket. As Lazarus states: “[T]he 
[Supreme Court] Bar heavily influences which cases the Justices take 
because the Court is heavily dependent on skilled advocates to 
provide them with the information they need to decide whether 
certiorari is warranted.”100 These lawyers know what the justices (or, 
more appropriately, their law clerks) are looking for at the agenda 
stage and craft briefs with that in mind.101 As a consequence, they are 
much more likely to see their certiorari petitions granted than other 
lawyers. Given their experience before the Court, former OSG 
attorneys are well positioned to set the Court’s agenda.
Some argue that former OSG attorneys are similarly successful 
at the merits stage. For example, in Lynch’s interviews with 
Supreme Court law clerks, 88% said they read briefs filed by expert 
attorneys (which we take to include many former OSG attorneys) 
more closely than those by less expert attorneys.102 Similarly, as we 
stated earlier, Corley uses plagiarism software to discover that the 
Court borrows more language in its opinions from briefs filed by 
experienced attorneys, and former OSG attorneys tend to be among 
the most experienced.103 McGuire also suggests that attorneys who 
are more experienced than their opposition are more likely to win.104  
Yet, other studies find that former OSG attorneys are no more 
likely to win their cases than similar attorneys who never worked in 
the OSG. Perhaps most relevant is the recent book on the Solicitor 
General by Black and Owens.105 They employ matching methods to 
determine whether former OSGs are more likely to win their cases 
than similar attorneys who never worked in the OSG.106 Their results 
show that former OSG attorneys are no more likely to win.107 Still, 
the Black and Owens analysis is limited in one critical way: it is time 
bound. The authors examine attorney success from the 1979–2007 
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terms.108 Since 2007, however, the Supreme Court bar has changed 
dramatically. Former OSG attorneys are more active in High Court 
cases than they were during the original Black and Owens study. 
Indeed, as Figure 4 showed, every term after 2007 observed the same 
or a larger percentage of former OSG lawyers than before 2007. 
Simply put, the bar has changed so the results may have changed. 
Thus, the question must be re-examined. We, therefore, test the 
following hypothesis: Attorneys who once worked in the Solicitor 
General’s office are more likely to win their cases than similarly 
qualified attorneys who never worked in the office. 
III. MATCHING, DATA, AND METHODS
We examine whether former OSG attorneys are more likely to 
win their cases than other attorneys by determining whether, in the 
absence of the former OSG, the Court’s decision would look the 
same as its decisions when the former OSG participates. Stated a bit 
differently, does the presence of an attorney who previously worked 
for the OSG cause that side to be more likely to win? The “gold 
standard” approach to addressing such a question would undoubtedly 
be to conduct an experiment.109 That is, given unlimited resources 
and no pesky restrictions on the use of human subjects, we would 
take a large number of cases to be decided by the Supreme Court and 
then randomly divide them into treatment and control groups.  
The treatment group would receive a former OSG attorney to 
represent it. The control group, by contrast, would be assigned an 
attorney who never worked in the OSG to represent it. So long as our 
sample was sufficiently large, the powers of randomization would 
neutralize the potential impact of all known (and unknown) 
confounding variables. That is, former OSG attorneys and non-
former OSG attorneys would both be assigned to cases that had 
“easy” facts as well as “tough” facts. Similarly, they would both be 
assigned in approximately equal proportion to cases with large (or 
small) amounts of involvement by outside interests in the form of 
amicus curiae briefs. Given randomization, we could attribute any 
differences we observed between the treatment and control groups to 
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the treatment effect (i.e., the fact that a former OSG attorney argued 
the case).110
Although it never hurts to dream, alas, such a design is 
impossible. As a result, social scientists have generally taken two, 
nonmutually exclusive approaches to trying to make causal 
inferences: the use of multiple regression and matching. 
Scholars have most commonly employed multiple-regression 
models to examine substantively interesting questions empirically.111
That is, they fit the appropriate type of regression model to the data 
(e.g., linear regression when the dependent variable is continuous; 
logistic regression when it is dichotomous).112 This model includes a 
number of independent variables designed to explain variation in the 
dependent variable.113 Most importantly, it includes the key variable 
of interest—in our case, whether an attorney formerly worked in the 
OSG. To guard against the harm of potential confounding variables, 
the models also include control variables.114
Such models, however, do not permit causal inferences unless 
one assumes that nature has randomly assigned individuals to the 
treatment and control groups and that the two groups are otherwise 
similar in all relevant respects. That is, one must assume that the data 
are “balanced” among the values of the independent variable for the 
treatment and control group. In our case, for example, this would 
imply that we could assume that the distribution of the values for our 
independent variables is the same for former OSG attorneys and 
attorneys who never worked there. For a large percentage of applied 
research questions, this assumption is likely dubious. For ours, based 
on the results we discuss below, that assumption would be plainly 
wrong. 
To overcome the problems associated with fitting standard 
parametric models to imbalanced data, researchers have increasingly 
turned to matching methods. One important study, for example, 
applied matching methods to investigate whether a judge’s sex 
causes different outcomes in the U.S. Courts of Appeal.115 After 
matching circuit court panels and cases on as many relevant 
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dimensions as possible, the authors looked to determine if an 
otherwise identical circuit court panel rules differently in a case 
simply because a woman serves as a judge on it (but not on the other 
panel).116 They found a slight difference in sex discrimination 
cases.117 Another study used matching methods to examine whether 
the presence of war causes Justices to restrict civil liberties.118 They 
found that it does, but not in the way commonly expected.119 These 
studies illustrate how matching can allow scholars to overcome 
limitations caused by imbalanced data and enhance the quality of the 
inferences researchers made by social scientists.  
The theory behind matching is intuitive. The analyst takes the 
data she has collected on the topic of interest and then matches 
observations such that the values of covariates in the treatment group
and control group are as close as possible to each other. 
Observations that do not match across groups are discarded. In other 
words, the goal is to retain data such that the treatment group is 
identical to the control group, with the only difference between the 
two being the presence of the treatment. In that sense, matching can 
be thought of as a kind of post hoc experimental design.  
The most intuitive matching technique, of course, is called 
“exact matching.” Here, the analyst “matches a treated unit to all of 
the control units with the same covariate values.”120 That is, the 
analyst identifies the treatment and then seeks out exact matches 
among the control group. Consider Table 1 below. Let us assume we 
have a former OSG attorney who has previously argued ten cases 
before the Court. If we applied an exact matching approach, we 
would need to find a non-former OSG attorney who also previously 
has argued ten cases before the Court—no more, no less. We would 
then compare the success rates of those attorneys who were former 
OSG attorneys against those that never worked for the OSG. If we 
observed differences between the two groups, we could infer that 
those differences were the result of the attorney having formerly 
worked in the OSG.121
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Experience 10 cases 10 cases
Distance From Court 3.2 3.2
Petitioner Status Petitioner Petitioner
That approach would be simple enough—until we had to 
account for multiple covariates. At that point, multi-dimensionality 
(also called the “curse of dimensionality”) makes exact matching 
intractable. To return to our example, if we wanted to examine the 
causal effect of our treatment while simultaneously controlling for 
attorney experience, ideological distance between the attorney and 
the Court, and whether the attorney was arguing on behalf of the 
petitioner or respondent, we would quickly reduce the number of 
exact matches between the treatment and control groups. We would 
need to find former OSG attorneys and non-former OSG attorneys 
with precisely the same characteristics. And unfortunately, it is 
unlikely we would observe many (if any) exact matches, especially if 
we insisted upon conducting matching without replacement.122
We therefore capitalize on innovations and improvements that 
make matching even more accessible and user-friendly. In particular, 
we turn to an approach called “Coarsened Exact Matching” (CEM) 
to preprocess our data.123 With coarsened exact matching, the 
researcher becomes empowered to apply his or her substantive 
expertise to define tolerable levels of imbalance within the data. 
Reconsider, from the table above, the role of attorney experience. To 
be sure, this is a critically important control variable. One of the key 
features of an attorney who has worked in the OSG’s office is that 
she has likely argued a number of cases before the Supreme Court. 
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Indeed, in the data we use below, each member of the OSG who 
argues before the Court does so an average of roughly thirteen times. 
As others have argued, failure to account for experience could lead 
us to conclude erroneously that an attorney’s alumnus status with the 
OSG make her more likely to win when, in fact, it might just be 
tapping into her experience advantage.124
Experience is clearly important, but must we insist upon an 
exact match in experience levels between our treatment and control 
group? Or, is it plausible that we can clump attorneys into different 
bins based on their approximate level of experience? A difference 
clearly exists between someone who has never argued at all versus 
someone who has at least one appearance. Among those who have 
argued, we probably also have good reason to believe that an 
attorney with but a single previous appearance is at a comparative 
disadvantage against someone with five appearances, who, in turn, is 
probably at a disadvantage against someone else with twenty 
appearances. But, at some point, the marginal advantage of greater 
experience disappears altogether.  
An example of two attorneys from our data illustrates. Paul D. 
Clement argued over forty cases before the Court while he was a 
deputy SG, the actual SG, and then in private practice. SG Donald B. 
Verrilli has argued around thirty cases between his appointment in 
2011 and the end of the Court’s 2014 term. Does that difference of 
ten cases really amount to a sizable advantage for Clement over 
Verrilli were they to square off? Our intuition says no. The benefit of 
CEM is that it allows us to capture that intuition, improve balance in 
our data, and retain the largest number of observations possible to 
enhance our statistical power. 
Table 2 provides an example of what CEM looks like in 
practice. Here, rather than demanding an exact match on attorney 
experience, we allow for some coarsening to occur. In particular, we 
now compare the success of two attorneys who both argued a 
substantial number of cases before the Court. We also allow some 
wiggle room in terms of the nature of the attorneys’ ideological 
distance from the Court—they are both somewhat far away 
ideologically from the justices, which is to say they are likely to face 
a challenge in terms of winning. Turning to the “Petitioner Status” 
variable, note that we do not allow any coarsening to appear here. 
For a variable that takes on a limited number of values and where it 
does not seem appropriate to pool those values together, the analyst 
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is able to require that exact matches occur for such measures. Given 
the Court’s tendency to reverse lower courts (i.e., vote for the 
petitioner), forcing such a match is substantively necessary (and 
relatively costless in terms of data loss). 
Table 2 







Experience 10 cases 12 cases
Distance From Court 3.2 2.9
Petitioner Status Petitioner Petitioner
Finally, lest this seem like much ado about nothing, consider 
what might happen if one were to proceed with the raw, unbalanced 
data. We portray this scenario in Table 3 below. We suggest a 
comparison that is essentially “apples and oranges” in terms of the 
level of differences between the two observations. We have a former 
OSG attorney who has an experience advantage, ideological 
congruence with the Court, and the benefit of being the petitioner. 
This individual is squaring off against an attorney with little 
experience, who is making an argument that is ideologically 
incongruent with the Court, and represents the respondent in a case. 
The former OSG attorney seems much more likely to win; if we 
were to allow such comparisons to exist, we might risk concluding 
her victory was due to her being an OSG alumnus when, in fact, it 









Experience 10 cases 1 cases
Distance From Court 3.2 6.2
Petitioner Status Petitioner Respondent
The foregoing illustrates both the risk of analyzing unbalanced 
data and how CEM can allow researchers to address this concern 
while still preserving the largest amount of data for his or her 
analysis. We turn next to describing how we apply matching to 
address the question of whether former OSG attorneys enjoy unique 
influence over the Supreme Court. 
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A. Matching the Data: Former OSG Attorneys and Non-Former OSG 
Attorneys  
To test whether former OSG attorneys are more likely to win 
their cases than similar non-former OSG attorneys, we collected all 
orally argued Supreme Court cases decided between the Court’s 
1979 and 2014 terms (N=3,336). We downloaded the oral argument 
transcript in each case from LexisNexis and identified each attorney 
who appeared at oral argument. Across the 3,336 cases, we observed 
7,993 attorney appearances distributed over approximately 4,345 
unique attorneys. Because our focus is on whether former OSG 
attorneys influence the Court, our unit of analysis is each attorney in 
each case. Therefore, we started with 7,993 potential observations 
and began to match the data, seeking to ensure that our treatment 
cases were as similar as possible to our control cases. 
We matched cases on a host of characteristics that likely 
influence litigant success but are nonrandomly distributed between 
former members of the OSG and non-former OSG attorneys. In 
particular, we examine many of the factors we discussed above (in 
re: SG success): attorney experience, net resource advantage, amicus 
curiae briefs (both supporting and opposing), petitioner status, an 
attorney’s ideological compatibility with the justices, and surrogates 
for the quality of a side’s case. 
1. Attorney Experience  
According to some, attorneys win when they are more 
experienced than their opponents.125 This theory holds that 
experienced attorneys gain insight through frequent contact with the 
Court.126 They acquire relevant information they can use later to win 
cases.127 They develop closer relationships with justices, which they 
can also use to their advantage (in terms of knowing what arguments 
justices want to hear).128 Such lawyers are more informed as to the 
questions the Court recently reviewed, legal issues of particular 
interest to particular justices, and pending cases on the Court’s 
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docket that may affect the disposition of the current case.129 These 
experienced lawyers know how to compile effective written and oral 
presentations.130 As Lazarus states:  
Because they immerse themselves in the work of the Court, the 
[experienced] attorneys of the Solicitor General’s Office, unlike many of 
their opposing counsel, become completely familiar with the Justices and 
their precedent, including their latest concerns and the inevitable cross-
currents between otherwise seemingly unrelated cases that would be 
largely invisible to those who focus on just one case at a time. They are 
also comfortable at the lectern, for the simple reason that they have been 
there often before at least as co-counsel, if not lead counsel, presenting 
argument[s]. They work hard as repeat litigants to establish their 
credibility with the Justices.131
Consequently, we matched on the amount of previous 
experience each attorney enjoyed when arguing before the Court. 
That is, we sought to ensure that our treatment group attorneys had 
as much experience before the Court as our control group attorneys. 
To measure attorney experience, we calculated the number of total 
prior cases each attorney in our sample orally argued before the 
Supreme Court prior to the case at issue.132 Our measure, then, is 
dynamic, looking backward from each case to the totality of the 
lawyer’s previous oral argument experience. As we note above, 
while CEM allows the user to specify a set of values to pool, in 
working with these data we have generally found that the automated 
binning executed by the software results in a great reduction of 
imbalance. This also allows the coarsening to be sensitive to unique 
characteristics of a specific treatment/control dataset. For example, 
the initial level of imbalance between an OSG attorney and a non-
OSG attorney is significantly greater than when we compare the 
OSG’s participation as a party versus its participation as amicus 
curiae. Accordingly, because our overriding goal is to maximize 
balance across the treatment and control group, we allow the CEM 
                                                     
129. Bruce J. Ennis, Effective Amicus Briefs, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 603, 605 
(1984). 
130. SCIGLIANO, supra note 77, at 183. 
131. Lazarus, supra note 85, at 1497. 
132. We examined each attorney’s oral argument experience rather than his 
presence on a brief or status as counsel of record for two reasons. First, oral 
argument experience has already been established as a reasonable measure of 
attorney experience. See, e.g., Johnson, Wahlbeck & Spriggs, supra note 28, at 100. 
Second, as McGuire points out, the United States Reports do not consistently record 
which attorneys were on the briefs in a case, but do consistently record the identity 
of the attorney who orally argued the case. See McGuire, supra note 76, at 512 n.4. 
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software to construct the bins for this and all other variables 
described below. In any event, our substantive effects are consistent 
if we manually coarsen the data (but with the caveat that we retain 
greater imbalance in the data). 
We measure two different variations of experience. First, we 
start by including the amount of experience for the attorney who is 
arguing before the Court. To this value we also add the experience of 
any additional attorneys who appear at oral argument as an amicus 
participant. We take this step to control for the possibility that while 
a specific attorney might be an oral argument novice, the presence of 
a veteran advocate as amici who also supports the novice’s side 
could help tip the scales towards victory in a case.133 Second, because 
the argument process is an adversarial one, we also include the 
cumulative amount of experience possessed by attorneys on the 
opposing side. The basic intuition here is that the likelihood of a 
seasoned veteran winning in a case should be higher when he is 
squaring off against a side represented by first timers as opposed to 
frequent Supreme Court litigators. 
2. Net Resource Advantage 
Some scholars have argued that parties win when they have 
resource advantages. Not surprisingly, studies have shown that 
parties with more resources fare better before the High Court.134
Galanter, for example, found that resource-advantaged litigants fared 
better than “one-shotters” because they use their resources to stack 
the deck in their favor.135 They tend to hire better lawyers who can 
conduct more extensive research.136 They engage the services of 
                                                     
133. Our results are substantively unchanged if we treat these two initial 
quantities separately. This is likely due to the high correlation between the measures. 
134. Paul M. Collins Jr., Lobbyists Before the U.S. Supreme Court: 
Investigating the Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs, 60 POL. RES. Q. 55 (2007) 
[hereinafter Collins, Lobbyists Before the U.S. Supreme Court]; Paul M. Collins Jr., 
Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus Curiae Participation in 
U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 807 (2004) [hereinafter 
Collins, Friends of the Court]; Joel B. Grossman, Herbert M. Kritzer & Stewart 
Macaulay, Do the “Haves” Still Come Out Ahead?, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 803 
(1999).  
135. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the 
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 98-100 (1974); see also Donald 
Songer, Ashlyn Kuersten & Erin Kaheny, Why the Haves Don’t Always Come Out 
Ahead: Repeat Players Meet Amici Curiae for the Disadvantaged, 53 POL. RES. Q.
537, 540 (2000). 
136. See Songer, Kuersten & Kaheny, supra note 135, at 540.  
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better expert witnesses who thereby create more influential trial court 
records.137 They can anticipate legal challenges to their actions and 
inoculate themselves against those challenges by creating 
“comprehensive litigation strateg[ies].”138 Stacking the deck provides 
these resource-rich players a formidable advantage. 
Accordingly, we also match attorneys on resource advantage to 
avoid inferring a special OSG advantage that might simply be a 
function of its resource advantages when compared to other 
attorneys. To match on litigant resources, we follow the trend among 
scholars and rank order litigants along a sliding continuum.139 We 
follow the approach of Collins140 and assign each petitioner and 
respondent to one of ten potential categories, which we present in 
ascending order of resources: poor individuals (=1), minorities (=2), 
nonminority individuals (=3), unions or interest groups (=4), small 
businesses (=5), businesses (=6), corporations (=7), local 
governments (=8), state governments (=9), and the U.S. government 
(=10). We then subtract the ranking for the opposing side from the 
ranking for the side being supported by a specific attorney, which 
identifies the relative differential between the two sides.141 Positive 
(negative) scores reflect cases in which the attorney’s side (opposing 
side) was advantaged. 
                                                     
137. See id.  
138. Donald R. Songer, Reginald S. Sheehan & Susan Brodie Haire, Do the 
“Haves” Come Out Ahead over Time? Applying Galanter’s Framework to 
Decisions of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1925-1988, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 811, 812 
(1999). 
139. See, e.g., Ryan C. Black et al., Emotions, Oral Arguments, and Supreme 
Court Decision Making, 73 J. POL. 572, 575 (2011); Ryan C. Black & Christina L. 
Boyd, US Supreme Court Agenda Setting and the Role of Litigant Status, 28 J. L. 
ECON. & ORG. 286, 291 (2010); Collins, Lobbyists Before the U.S. Supreme Court,
supra note 134, at 60; Collins, Friends of the Court, supra note 134, at 819; Songer, 
Sheehan & Haire, supra note 138, at 817; Reginald S. Sheehan, William Mishler & 
Donald R. Songer, Ideology, Status, and the Differential Success of Direct Parties 
Before the Supreme Court, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 464, 465 (1992); Donald R. 
Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, Who Wins on Appeal? Upperdogs and Underdogs in 
the United States Courts of Appeals, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 235, 242 (1992).  
140. Collins, Friends of the Court, supra note 134, at 819; PAUL M. COLLINS,
JR., FRIENDS OF THE SUPREME COURT: INTEREST GROUPS AND JUDICIAL DECISION 
MAKING (2008). 
141. An alternative approach would involve matching on the rank of the 
attorney’s side and the opposing side. We opted to match on the differential for two 
reasons. First, we believe the difference in resources is more important than the 
actual identity of the parties. Second, when we try to match on the identity of the 
parties, we are unable to retrieve enough matches to make meaningful inferences. 
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3. Amicus Briefs 
A host of studies suggest that amicus curiae briefs influence the 
choices justices make.142 Collins shows that, after holding all else 
constant, the petitioner’s probability of victory increases roughly 6% 
simply because of the presence of a few supportive amicus briefs.143
Spriggs and Wahlbeck show that the Court often adopts language of 
amicus curiae briefs in its opinions.144 Paul Wahlbeck shows that 
amicus support often influences legal change.145 As such, we 
believed it important to control for their presence. Using data 
provided by Collins, which we updated for the 2002–2007 terms, we 
created a variable that measured the number of amicus briefs 
supporting each attorney’s side, which we then used in the CEM 
algorithm.146
4. Petitioner Status 
The modern Court tends to reverse the cases it reviews.147 Since 
there is a built-in bias towards reversing lower court decisions, we 
thought it empirically prudent to level the playing field by matching 
petitioner attorneys against other petitioner attorneys and respondent 
attorneys against other respondent attorneys. As such, we matched 
cases based on whether the attorney—including those that appeared 
as amicus curiae—represented (or supported) the petitioner or the 
respondent. 
5. Ideological Distance from the Court 
A different view of attorney success examines the ideological 
agreement between the attorney and the Court. A large portion of 
judicial decision making turns on the ideological preferences of 
                                                     
142. See COLLINS, supra note 140; Collins, Friends of the Court, supra note 
134; McGuire, supra note 8, at 193. 
143. Collins, Friends of the Court, supra note 134, at 822; see also COLLINS,
supra note 140. 
144. James F. Spriggs, II & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Amicus Curiae and the Role 
of Information at the Supreme Court, 50 POL. RES. Q. 365, 373 (1997). 
145. See Wahlbeck, supra note 10.
146. Paul M. Collins, Jr., Amici Curiae and Dissensus on the U.S. Supreme 
Court, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 143, 153-60 (2008). 
147. See H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1991); Jan Palmer, An Econometric Analysis of 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 39 PUB. CHOICE 387, 396 (1982). 
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justices.148 As such, we determined for each attorney in each case in 
our sample his ideological distance from the Court median. 
Following previous research,149 we determined, first, the ideological 
direction of the lower court decision as reported in the Supreme 
Court Database.150 If that decision was liberal (conservative) we 
coded the petitioner as making a conservative (liberal) argument. If 
the petitioner’s argument was conservative, we coded Ideological 
Distance as the Court median’s ideal point, as estimated by Martin 
and Quinn.151 If the argument was liberal, we coded Ideological 
Distance by multiplying the Court median’s Martin-Quinn score by -1.
6. Case Quality: Lower Court Disagreement and Conflict Case 
We also control for the quality of the case. We suspect that the 
underlying quality of the case could lead some lawyers to win more 
than others. Accordingly, we match on two measures of case quality. 
First, we examine whether a judge in the lower court dissented. Most 
circuit court cases do not observe dissents because dissent is 
costly.152 It requires time and effort of the dissenting judge; it also 
makes life more difficult for the majority opinion writer. Forcing 
busy colleagues to respond to a dissent can impose social costs on 
the dissenter. As such, we suspect that judges are more likely to 
dissent when the losing party presents a high-quality argument. Thus, 
we code whether (=1) or not (=0) there was a lower court dissent in 
the case. Second, we examine whether the lower courts conflicted 
over the proper interpretation of the law. When the lower courts 
conflict, it signals that there are multiple reasonable outcomes in a 
case. That is, each party might have a strong argument. These cases 
should be distinguished from those without conflict, where the 
                                                     
148. See generally Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).
149. Johnson, Wahlbeck & Spriggs, supra note 28, at 106. 
150. See Current Dataset: 2015 Release 01, SUP. CT. DATABASE (Aug. 17, 
2015), http://supremecourtdatabase.org/data.php?s=1 [https://perma.cc/7BJH-6PGG]. 
151. Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation 
via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 POL.
ANALYSIS 134 (2002). 
152. See LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF 
RATIONAL CHOICE 255 (2013). 
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outcome seems clearer. Thus, we code for whether (=1) or not (=0) 
there was conflict among the lower courts.153
IV. EMPIRICAL METHODS AND ANALYSES
Our dependent variable takes on a value of 1 if the side an 
attorney represents wins and 0 if it loses. Our key independent 
variable of interest is a binary indicator for whether an observation 
was assigned to the treatment (=1) or control (=0) group. In what 
follows, we describe and present results for a series of 
treatment/control pairings. For each pairing, we pre-processed our 
data using CEM and then estimated a logistic regression model on 
the matched data. Following the recommendation of Ho and his 
coauthors, we include each pre-treatment variable as a regressor in 
our models to reduce the effects of any remaining imbalance in the 
data.154 Using these parameter estimates, which we report in the 
appendix, we then conducted simulations to generate predicted 
probabilities (and confidence intervals) for each treatment effect. We 
derived such probabilities from a hypothetical attorney who 
otherwise had a 50% probability of winning her case. The values 
plotted, then, show the change in the probability of winning for such 
a coin-flip attorney who is in the treatment group as opposed to the 
control. We portray these results graphically in the three panels of 
Figure 5 below. 
Starting with Panel A, we ask whether current members of the 
OSG are distinctly more successful than attorneys who are neither 
currently nor previously affiliated with the OSG. Although our main 
question in this Article is about the impact of former members of the 
OSG, this initial comparison is still important. Though the basic 
relationship of OSG success has already been documented in the 
literature,155 we have expanded the data on which that initial finding 
was based by nearly 20%, including roughly 400 new instances of 
                                                     
153. We obtain data for both these measures by looking to the Supreme 
Court Database. The Database, of course, codes whether the Court referenced the 
presence of a dissent below or the presence of conflict. In our context, this “selection 
effect” is likely beneficial because it highlights those cases that seem to be of higher 
quality.
154. Daniel E. Ho et al., Matching as Nonparametric Preprocessing for 
Reducing Model Dependence in Parametric Causal Inference, 15 POL. ANALYSIS
199 (2007). 
155. See BLACK & OWENS, supra note 1; see also Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. 
Owens, A Built-In Advantage: The Office of the Solicitor General and the U.S. 
Supreme Court, 66 POL. RES. Q. 454 (2013). 
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when an OSG attorney appeared before the Court. Perhaps more 
importantly, however, these revised data also include about 900 
instances of non-OSG attorneys, which provide more potential high-
quality matches. This is significant because, as we note above, 
attorneys from the OSG enjoy a number of potential advantages, not 
the least of which is an abundance of experience. 
Figure 5 
DOTPLOT OF TREATMENT EFFECT FOR THREE TREATMENT/CONTROL 
COMPARISONS
 
In each of the above panels, the circle points indicate the results from an 
unmatched analysis (analogous to the scenario depicted above in Table 3). 
The square points show the results from the matched analysis (e.g., Table 
2 from above). The vertical whiskers denote 95% simulation intervals 
(two-tailed). 
As the panel makes clear, we continue to find substantial 
evidence of current OSG influence—even after pairing OSG 
attorneys with others who are similar in all respects but for their 
affiliation with the OSG. To wit, if a non-OSG attorney has a 50% 
chance of winning her case, we estimate that an otherwise identical 
attorney from the OSG has about a 70% chance of winning simply 
because she is affiliated with the OSG. This is a substantial effect 
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impressive relative effect (i.e., +40%). In short, we continue to find 
evidence that the OSG influences the High Court. 
Panel B takes a step closer towards our main question of 
interest. Here, we pit OSG attorneys against former OSG attorneys. 
The value of this comparison is that it provides us with a unique 
opportunity to control for something that, while undoubtedly 
important, is difficult to measure: attorney quality. The OSG is 
incredibly selective in whom it employs, choosing only attorneys 
with the strongest education credentials and work experience. It 
should come as no surprise, for example, that of the 133 unique OSG 
attorneys who appear in our data, fully 52% of them (i.e., 69) had 
previously clerked for a Supreme Court justice. By limiting our 
control group to former OSG attorneys, we raise the bar of finding 
real evidence of the OSG’s influence. At the same time, by 
comparing the magnitude of the OSG’s advantage between non-
former OSG attorneys and former OSG attorneys, we can gain 
valuable knowledge about whether former OSG attorneys might be 
stronger than those who never worked there. 
The results from Panel B support both of these ideas. First, we 
find that even when paired with former OSG attorneys, current OSG 
attorneys are more likely to win. The estimated treatment effect is 
about 0.14, which is to say that in a coin-flip situation, an OSG 
attorney would be expected to win nearly two-thirds of the time, 
which is a relative increase of about 28%. At the same time, and 
consistent with the idea that former OSG attorneys are somehow 
unique, we observe that the size of the OSG’s advantage appears to 
shrink a bit (i.e., 0.20 > 0.14). 
Finally, in Panel C, we examine how former OSG attorneys 
fare when compared to attorneys who never worked in the OSG. To 
reiterate, we continue to match on all the covariates identified above, 
which include things like attorney experience, case quality, and the 
number of outside interests both supporting and opposing the case. 
To the extent that it is possible, then, we have ensured that the only 
remaining difference between these two groups of attorneys is that 
one group is former OSG attorneys and the other is not. 
The points within the panel reveal a very interesting pair of 
results. Though we have not made much of it until now, our figure 
provides two distinct effect estimates. The circle within each panel 
comes from the unmatched data. That is to say, it is derived as 
though we were unaware of matching and the dangers of imbalance, 
and simply estimated our standard logistic regression model on the 
full data. In the previous two panels, the result from the unmatched 
360 Michigan State Law Review  2016 
analysis largely aligned with matched result. When we compare 
former OSG attorneys versus non-former OSG attorneys, however, 
we see a clear disconnect in conclusions. In particular, when using 
the full unmatched data, we estimate a modest—but statistically 
significant—positive effect for being a former OSG attorney. A non-
OSG attorney with a 0.50 probability of winning would anticipate 
roughly a 0.08 gain in that probability if she were an OSG alum. This 
is a relative increase of about 16%. But, drawing this conclusion 
would be wrong. When we employ a more appropriate methodology 
(i.e., matching) and achieve greater balance between these two types 
of attorneys,156 the apparent former OSG attorney advantage 
disappears. The point estimate becomes statistically insignificant.157
We find no systematic evidence that former OSG attorneys are any 
more (or less) likely to win than other similarly experienced and 
situated attorneys. 
Do former OSGs enjoy a unique advantage over other 
attorneys? Our analysis, which incorporates data from over thirty-
five terms of Supreme Court decision making, says no. In the formal 
parlance of statistical hypothesis testing, this is to say that we fail to 
reject the null hypothesis that a difference in winning propensity 
exists between these two populations (i.e., former OSG attorneys and 
non-former OSG attorneys). Having made this conclusion, two 
possibilities exist. First, it could be the case that we are right and 
there’s really no difference between these two types of attorneys. 
Second, it could be that a difference does actually exist, but our 
study was not sufficiently large to uncover it. This is called a Type II 
error.158
                                                     
156. The initial level of imbalance in this analysis is quite large. The 
multivariate L1 value for the unmatched data is 0.60. For the matched data it is just 
0.13—a relative reduction of more than 75%. The analogous values for the other 
two analyses are (unmatched/matched): 0.51/0.06 (Current OSG vs. Non-OSG), 
0.58/0.13 (Current OSG vs. Former OSG). 
157. The two-tailed p-value on the effect is 0.63, which puts it very far away 
from conventional levels of statistical significance (i.e., 0.05 or, more liberally, 
0.10). Indeed, a p-value of 0.20 or greater is a commonly used threshold for 
accepting the null hypothesis. Timothy R. Johnson, James F. Spriggs II & Paul J. 
Wahlbeck, Passing and Strategic Voting on the U.S. Supreme Court, 39 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 349, 368 n.31 (2005) (citing HUBERT M. BLALOCK, JR., SOCIAL 
STATISTICS 161 (2d ed.1979)). 
158. A Type I error, by contrast, occurs when the researcher rejects the null 
hypothesis even though it is true. Because we fail to reject the null hypothesis, there 
is no chance that we have committed this error. 
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How likely is it that we’ve made such a mistake? The 
probability of a Type II error depends on two factors: (1) how big of 
an effect size do we wish to recover, and (2) with what level of 
reliability do we wish to recover it? Conditional on these two values, 
we can determine, via a power analysis, whether the sample size in a 
study was sufficient to find an effect, given that one did actually 
exist. 
We use simulations to conduct our power analysis. We start by 
taking 729 draws from a binomial distribution with a known 
probability of success of 0.53. The number 729 corresponds to the 
number of observations in the control group in our matched sample. 
We choose 0.53 as it corresponds to the overall win rate in our data. 
We then take 125 draws from a second binomial distribution. Here, 
however, we iteratively vary the known probability of success from 
0.54 to 0.68, which is to say we add 0.01, 0.02, . . . , 0.15 to the 
baseline win rate. This represents the potential advantage of being a 
former OSG attorney. With these two samples in hand, we simply 
conduct a difference-in-proportions test to see if a significant 
difference exists. We then repeat this entire process a large number 
(i.e., 10,000) of times to smooth out any idiosyncrasies arising from 
a particular sample.  
Figure 6 below plots the results of these simulations. Along the 
x-axis, we show the magnitude of the difference in win probabilities 
that existed in the samples we calculated. For example, 0.01 means 
that we took 125 random draws from a binomial distribution where 
the probability of success in any single draw was 0.54, which is 0.01 
greater than the baseline value of 0.53. The y-axis then reports the 
proportion of the 10,000 simulations where we recovered a 
statistically significant difference between the two samples.159 This is 
the power of such a study. The critical thing to bear in mind here is 
that an actual difference did exist between the two samples. 
                                                     
159. We use a one-tailed p-value of 0.20 to make this determination. We 
choose this value since it is the threshold identified above in an earlier footnote for 
accepting the null hypothesis. 




The x-axis presents the size of a simulated difference between the former 
OSG attorney and someone who never worked there. E.g., 0.05 means that 
an OSG alum enjoys a 0.05 boost in winning over someone who never 
worked there. The y-axis shows the likelihood that a study with our 
specific sample sizes would be able to recover this difference. We 
generated these estimates by repeating a simulation procedure 10,000 
times. See text for additional details.  
Unsurprisingly, the power to detect small differences is weak. 
For example, we would only be able to detect a treatment effect of 
0.01 about 24% of the time we conducted such an analysis. As the 
effect size increases, however, so too does our ability to capture it. A 
5% difference in the chances of winning between a former OSG 
attorney and a non-OSG attorney would be captured by our analysis 
a majority (54%) of the time. As one would expect, just like common 
thresholds exist for deciding to reject or accept the null hypothesis, 
researchers have also proposed an analogous value for statistical 
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power, with 0.80 being the most commonly used value.160 For the 
power analysis reported above, the 0.80 power level corresponds to a 
treatment effect of 0.085, which, coincidentally, is nearly identical to 
the exact value of the unmatched treatment effect we found above. 
This allows us to say, with a good deal of confidence, that if the 
unmatched effect actually did exist, that we would still be able to 
detect and document it in the matched data we have used. At the 
same time, of course, prudence demands that we concede that a small 
advantage experienced by former OSG attorneys might exist and our 
study simply lacked the power in order to recover it. If a former OSG 
attorney’s real win rate was actually 0.56 compared to non-OSG 
attorney’s rate of 0.53, then our study would reveal that just below 
40% of the time. So, although we cannot say that absolutely no 
difference exists between former OSG attorneys and their non-OSG 
counterparts, any differences are likely to be so small as to be 
unimportant substantively. 
CONCLUSION
Former OSG attorneys appear before the Court now more than 
ever in recent history. They can rely on their experience before the 
Court. They are highly skilled. They are likely to know what it takes 
to win. And so they command attention—and large legal fees. But 
are they more likely to win their cases than similar attorneys who 
never worked in the OSG? Our results say no. Of course, we should 
point out that we do not seek to diminish the skills of former OSG 
attorneys. That is not our point; far from it. Rather, we simply seek 
to determine whether they are more successful than other high-
quality attorneys. 
That OSG attorneys are just as successful as other similar 
attorneys suggests three important things. First, it suggests that there 
is indeed something unique about the OSG. Whatever cache an 
attorney has with the Supreme Court while working for the OSG 
seems to evaporate the moment they leave that office. This speaks 
volumes about the unique importance of the OSG.  
Second, the results suggest that OSG attorneys do not learn 
anything “proprietary” about the Court while they are there. They 
gain experience and skills that non-OSG attorneys can also gain. 
                                                     
160. See, e.g., JACOB COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE 
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 16-17 (1988). 
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They do not appear, however, to learn anything unique about the 
justices that outsiders could not learn.  
Third, the results suggest that if litigants pay extra money to 
hire former OSG attorneys, they might more profitably spend their 
resources elsewhere. That is, if they pay a premium for former OSG 
attorneys, they might be spending too much. Former OSG attorneys 
are skilled and successful, to be sure. But it does not appear that they 
are any more likely to win their cases than attorneys with similar 
experiences and characteristics who never worked in the OSG. 
Assuming litigants can locate such attorneys, and we suspect they 
can with a little research, they might be able to secure equally strong 
representation for potentially a cheaper price tag.  
We hope scholars continue to examine the influence of 
particular kinds of attorneys before the Court. For example, one area 
of scholarship might look at former Supreme Court law clerks before 
the High Court. It is possible that such attorneys have inside 
information about justices that other attorneys do not have. 
Alternatively, they might not be any more successful than non-
clerks, an outcome that would complement our findings here. 
Similarly, future studies could examine the influence of former 
Solicitors General themselves. One might also compare former 
agency attorneys against other attorneys in complex litigation. 
Finally, scholars might examine the influence of attorneys in the 
federal circuits, where they arguably matter more. By so doing, we 




The three figures below present parameter estimates from the 
logistic regression models described earlier in the Article. The point 
shape corresponds to the type of data used for the model, with circles 
showing estimates for the full, unmatched data and squares providing 
estimates for the matched data (i.e., the same as the figures with the 
marginal effects that appear above). We use point shading and the 
presence of an “X” to identify which variables are (or are not)
statistically significant. Light gray with an “X” means the variable is 
not significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test). Black without an 
“X” means the variable has a two-tailed p-value of 0.05 or smaller. 
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